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IN FACT, IT'S A MATTER OF OPINION: 
DETERMINING A DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN FACT AND OPINION WITHIN 
THE NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE OF 
HONEST OPINION 
Wendy J Riseley* 
This article discusses the distinction between fact and opinion within the defence of honest opinion. 
It is argued that the classic legal tests for determining that distinction are largely unhelpful and 
produce unpredictable results, which trigger a chilling effect on speech. This article advocates for 
an adaptation of the four-factor totality of circumstances test, established in Ollman v Evans, to be 
inserted into the Defamation Act 1992. This would provide more clarity, consistency and 
predictability for the defence of honest opinion in New Zealand, thereby better supporting freedom 
of expression under s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The common law defence of honest opinion to defamation proceedings provides a bulwark for 
one of society's most salient rights: freedom of expression. Whether a statement is held to be an 
opinion or a fact can make the difference between the defendant winning or having to pay damages. 
However, courts throughout the common law jurisdictions battle with the distinction. So murky and 
contentious is this boundary that it often seems that the only way to know if a statement is 
defamatory is to send it through the legal machine of the courts and see what emerges. The results 
can be baffling. In one case it was held defamatory to call someone "hideously ugly",1 in another for 
a food critic to describe the food as "inedible".2 In both instances the communicators felt they were 
simply voicing their opinions and should be free to do so. This uncertainty in the law can cause 
  
*  Article submitted as part of the LLB(Hons) programme at Victoria University of Wellington. I would like to 
thank my supervisor, Steven Price, for his helpful guidance and comments. 
1  Berkoff v Burchill [1997] EMLR 139. 
2  John Martin "The Blue Angel Defamation Trial" (1989) 11 Gazette of L&J 13.  
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people to check themselves to such an extent that free speech is hindered. The United Kingdom 
Court of Appeal recently widened the concept of opinion, stating that the lower Court's ruling 
against the defendant had "most certainly had a chilling effect on public debate".3 
This article will argue that the current methods determining a dividing line between fact and 
opinion are unworkable because no bright-line exists. After a summary of the law surrounding the 
defence of honest opinion, the rationale behind protecting opinion is discussed. The article then 
looks at the inadequacy of the fact–opinion distinction and its inability to support that rationale. 
Finally, after a survey of some current legal tests, a more flexible and predictable eight-factor test is 
proposed to address the dichotomy and better support free speech. 
II THE LAW OF HONEST OPINION 
The law of defamation aims to vindicate and prevent unjustified damage to reputations. In New 
Zealand, this endeavour comes by way of the common law and is supported by the Defamation Act 
1992. While the statute does not supply a definition, Lord Atkin in Sim v Stretch described a 
defamatory statement as one that has a tendency to lower a person "in the estimation of right-
thinking members of society generally".4 To help provide a balance protecting free speech, the law 
of defamation provides four defences: truth, honest opinion, and absolute and qualified privilege.5 
The first two are relevant for the purposes of this article. The truth defence is available where the 
defendant has made a factual statement that he can prove true. The defence of honest opinion 
requires greater explanation. In essence, this defence protects an individual's ability to voice their 
opinions. While some courts argue that opinions should be protected because they are not 
defamatory,6 the English treatise, Gatley on Libel and Slander, considers it better to view opinion 
statements as defamatory but not actionable.7 This defence is subject to three limitations. 
A The Opinion Must Be Genuine 
Under s 10 of the Defamation Act 1992, the genuineness of the opinion is paramount. While a 
factual statement is objectively determined to be true or false, a defendant's genuine belief in their 
statement is a subjective test, concerned with his state of mind.8 The question the courts ask is 
  
3  British Chiropractic Association v Singh [2010] EWCA Civ 350, [2011] 1 WLR 133 at [11]. 
4  Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 at 1240. 
5  Defamation Act 1992, ss 8, 9–12, 13–15, 16–19. 
6  Campbell v Spottiswoode (1863) 3 B & S 769; Minister of Justice v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd (1979) 3 
SA 466.  
7  Patrick Milmo and WVH Rodgers (eds) Gatley on Libel and Slander (11th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2008) at [12.1]. 
8  John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (6th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2010) at 
[3.2.3]. 
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whether any man could honestly hold the views and express the opinion on those facts.9 This test is 
one of honesty, not of reasonableness.10 Thus, the question is not whether one agrees with the 
comment. The commentator may be prone to exaggeration or have obstinate, even prejudicial 
views.11 This will not in itself defeat the defence. Furthermore, proof of actual malice is not an 
exception to honesty.12 However, if sheer invective is used, this may be "compelling evidence" of a 
lack of genuine belief in the opinion.13 In addition, public interest is no longer a requirement. 14 
While important to note the element of honesty, it is the following two limitations that this paper is 
primarily concerned with.  
B The Opinion Must Be Clearly Opinion 
If the statement is a fact, the defence of honest opinion will not be available. Opinion has been 
described as "something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, 
conclusion, criticism, remark, observation, etc".15 It must be obvious to the reader16 that the 
statement is an opinion,17 but distinguishing between fact and opinion can be difficult. Currently, 
New Zealand courts often consider the contextual background of the statement to tell them how that 
statement would likely be interpreted:18 
Presentation is crucial to whether a statement is or is not an expression of opinion.  
… 
The defence applies when the words appear to a reasonable reader to be conclusionary. 
Similarly, courts in the United Kingdom often distinguish fact from opinion by a contextual 
analysis looking through the "prism of the reader".19 An unclear statement may simply be treated as 
  
9  At [3.2.3], citing Lord Diplock in Associated Newspapers v Burstein [2007] EWCA Civ 600 at [519]–[520]. 
10  Mitchell v Sprott [2002] 1 NZLR 766 (CA) at [24]. 
11  Merivale v Carson (1887) 20 QBD 275 at 281; Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [1958] 2 All ER 516 
at 520; Mitchell v Sprott, above n 10, at [24]. 
12  Defamation Act 1992, s 12. 
13  Tse Wai Chun v Cheng [2000] HKCFA 86, [2001] EMLR 31 at [57]. 
14  Awa v Independent News Auckland Ltd [1997] 3 NZLR 590 (CA) at 595. 
15  Clarke v Norton [1910] VLR 494 at 499. 
16  References in this article to "reader", assume "listener" as well.  
17  Burrows and Cheer, above n 8, at [3.2.2]. See also Hunt v Star Newspaper Co Ltd [1908] 2 KB 309 at 319. 
18  Mitchell v Sprott, above n 10, at [18–19]; Burrows and Cheer, above n 8, at [3.2.2]. 
19  Joseph v Spiller [2010] UKSC 53, [2011] 1 AC 852 at 855.  
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if it were a fact.20 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer identify some types of statements that can cause 
difficulties, including: those that mix together facts and opinion such that the opinion cannot be 
separated out; those that appear as fact but are conclusions inferred from facts; and those that appear 
as opinions but are not supported by any facts.21 
C The Opinion Must Be Based On a Substratum of Facts 
Two conditions must exist for this element to be met. First, unless they are common knowledge, 
the facts on which the opinion is based must be stated. In this way, the reader can consider the 
communicator's opinion and compare it against his own.22 In Tse Wai Chun v Cheng, Lord Nicholls 
established that the supporting facts must be sufficient for the reader to "judge for himself how far 
the comment was well founded".23 This test has now been altered to "whether the reader can 
recognise that what is being stated is comment".24 
The facts set out need not be the entire facts, or else a theatre reviewer, for instance, would need 
to set out the entire script of a play.25 The subject matter need only be "indicated with sufficient 
clarity to justify the comment being made".26 If the facts on which the opinion is based are common 
knowledge, the reader will be able to determine if the opinion is justified without those facts being 
stated.  
Secondly, the facts on which the opinion is based must be "proved true or not materially 
different from the truth".27 Two exceptions to this condition exist.28 If false facts are protected by 
privilege, then they may still support an honest opinion defence. Furthermore, if there are enough 
true facts stated or common knowledge to justify the opinion then not all facts supporting the 
opinion need to be true.  
  
20  At 855. 
21  Burrows and Cheer, above n 8, at [3.2.2]; see Part IV.B – Underlying Problem. 
22  Burrows and Cheer, above n 8, at [3.2.1(a)]. 
23  Tse Wai Chun v Cheng [2000] HKCFA 86, [2001] EMLR 31 at [19]. 
24  Milmo and Rodgers, above n 7, at [12.8] discussing the test from Lowe v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] 
EWHC 320 (QB). 
25  Gardiner v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd  (1942) 42 SRNSW 171 at 179. 
26  Burrows and Cheer, above n 8, at [3.2.1(a)]; Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345 at 347. 
27  Mitchell v Sprott, above n 10, at [22]; Defamation Act 1992, s 11(a). 
28  Burrows and Cheer, above n 8, at [3.2.1(b)]. 
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The defendant's state of mind is relevant, as he "cannot rely on as support of his opinion any 
facts not in existence when it was made or of which he was not aware".29  
This final limitation is closely connected with the earlier aim in assisting a reader to recognise a 
statement as opinion. With a substratum of facts set out, a statement will appear to the reader more 
like an opinion. 
D New Zealand and United Kingdom Comparison 
While New Zealand defamation law regularly draws on law from the United Kingdom, there 
have been, and are, some important differences. Prior to the enactment of the Defamation Act 2013 
(UK), the defence of honest opinion was called "honest comment".30 Public interest was a 
requirement under that defence. The new Act removes the public interest requirement and 
introduces a serious harm threshold, whereby the statement must meet that threshold before a claim 
for defamation can be brought to the courts. This raises the bar for claimants.31 Notably, privilege is 
extended to include peer-reviewed scientific and academic journals.32  
III RATIONALE BEHIND THE HONEST OPINION DEFENCE 
The protection of honest opinion is a mainstay of freedom of expression. It is the "right of the 
citizen to express his genuine opinion … however wrong or exaggerated or prejudiced that opinion 
may be".33 This defence supports overlapping arguments for freedom of expression, such as the 
search for truth, self-governance and the autonomy of the individual. In New Zealand, the right to 
free speech is embodied in s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. It endorses "the 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form".34 Under s 5, 
this freedom is subject to reasonable limitations "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society".35  
  
29  Milmo and Rodgers, above n 7, at [12.3]. But see Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 3(4); Timothy Pinto 
"Defamation Act 2013: A boost for free speech – Part 1: Serious Harm, Truth and Honest Opinion" (2013) 
Inforrm’s Blog: The International Forum for Responsible Media Blog <inforrm.wordpress.com>. 
30  Joseph v Spiller, above n 19, at [117]. For purposes of this article, which looks to various jurisdictions, the 
terms "fair comment" and "honest opinion" will be used interchangeably. But see, Milmo and Rodgers, 
above n 7, at [12.6] for discussion regarding different implications of each term. 
31  Defamation Act 2013 (UK) (explanatory notes) at 11.  
32  Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 6. 
33  Telnikoff v Matusevitch [1992] 2 AC 343 at 357. See also Gertz v Robert Welch Inc 418 US 323 (1974) at 
339. 
34  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
35  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
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A Marketplace of Ideas 
Safeguarding genuine opinions captures one of the key purposes behind free speech, namely to 
create a marketplace of ideas.36 These types of statements "support an unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by people",37 and, thus, are in the 
public interest.38 As Learned Hand J remarked, "the right conclusions are more likely to be gathered 
out of a multitude of tongues".39 Notwithstanding the aim of "right conclusions", unpopular views 
can provide a useful backboard against which debate can arise. As such, the defence of honest 
opinion protects obstinate, exaggerated, even prejudiced views. The courts do not judge the 
reasonableness of the opinion.40  
Similar to obstinate and prejudicial views, arguably false facts too have a purpose in society. 
They provide the stepping stones for discovery by stimulating debate in bringing about "the clearer 
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error".41 Dealing with the 
facts that underlie ideas, even if they are false, "bears a proportionate relationship" to the freedom to 
discuss those ideas.42  
However, false facts that damage reputation may cross the line from the protection of s 14 into 
the realm of s 5. As such, the purpose behind free speech is often better supported by being balanced 
with the protection of reputation.43 Without that balance, "a newspaper just as easily could call a 
candidate a rapist, an axe-murderer, or an ivory-billed woodpecker".44 Ignoring the balance risks 
"protecting too much inaccurate and harmful reporting".45 A society soaked in erroneous and 
destructive information risks stalling a productive exchange of ideas. Accordingly, the limitation put 
on false facts that damage reputation is usually justified in a free and democratic society.  
  
36  David Bromwich and George Kateb (eds) John Stuart Mill: On Liberty (Vali-Ballou Press, New York, 
2003) at 118. 
37  Roth v United States 347 US 476 (1957) at 484. 
38  Lyon v Daily Telegraph [1943] KB 746 at 752. 
39  United States v Associated Press 52 F Supp 362 (SD NY 1943) at 372. 
40  Mitchell v Sprott, above n 10. 
41  New York Times v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964) at 279, n 19. 
42  Frederick Schauer "Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter" 
(1978) 64 Va L Rev 263 at 273. 
43  Ollman v Evans 750 F 2d 970 (DC Cir 1984) [Ollman] at 974. 
44  Schauer, above n 42, at 289. 
45  Abner Mivka "In My Opinion, Those Are Not Facts" (1995) 11 Ga St U L Rev 291 at 299. 
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B Scientific Progress 
Within the scope of the marketplace of ideas lies the significance of promoting debate and the 
exchange of ideas within the fields of science and medicine. In the recent case of British 
Chiropractic Association v Singh (Singh), science was touted as a sector where opinion should be 
especially protected.46 Dr Singh had written an article in The Guardian’s "Comment and Debate" 
page criticising the British Chiropractic Association (BCA). It alleged that the BCA "happily 
promoted bogus treatments" and did so without there being "a jot of evidence" to support the 
effectiveness of those treatments.47 Eady J in the High Court ruled that the allegations were plainly 
"a matter of verifiable fact".48 The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, noting that the High 
Court ruling had "most certainly had a chilling effect on public debate which might otherwise have 
assisted potential patients to make informed choices about the possible use of chiropractic".49  
C Counter-Balance for Absolute and Qualified Privilege 
The protection of opinion provides a balance to the privileges accorded public officials in 
regards to statements made in their official duties.50 These privileges allow them to "speak freely 
without fear that what they say will later be held against them in the Courts".51 However, without 
the equivalent freedom to voice opinions, public officials would have an "unjustified preference 
over the public they serve".52 As Brennan J observed, "analogous considerations support the 
privilege for the citizen-critic of government. It is as much his duty to criticise as it is the official’s 
duty to administer."53 Thus, the defence of honest opinion acts as a "brake on the abuse of power by 
public officials",54 and exposes individuals to a variety of beliefs, which they then can convey back 
to the government. 
  
46  British Chiropractic Association v Singh, above n 3. 
47  At [1]. 
48  At [14]. 
49  At [11]. 
50  Jeffrey Kirchmeier "The Illusion of the Fact-Opinion Distinction in Defamation Law" (1989) 39 Case W 
Res L Rev 867 at 872. 
51  Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd [1994] 3 NZLR 1 (PC) at 8. 
52  New York Times v Sullivan, above n 41, at 282–283. 
53  At 282. 
54  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [1999] 3 WLR 328 at 337. 
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D Alleviating the Strictness of the Defence of Truth 
The defence of truth55 protects the defendant from being sued if the imputations contained in the 
statements complained of were "true or not materially different from the truth" or if "the publication 
taken as a whole was in substance true, or was in substance not materially different from the 
truth".56 Although a true statement may still lower a person in the estimation of others, the reason 
for the truth defence is that it entitles a person "only to the reputation his or her behaviour 
deserves".57  
Nevertheless, the uncertainty of being able to prove the truth of a statement to a high enough 
degree to satisfy the courts raises concerns of self-censorship.58 As a result, false statements may be 
deterred but also true ones and opinions. This chilling effect on free speech "dampens the vigour 
and limits the variety of debate".59 
Without the defence of honest opinion to alleviate it, the truth defence is unsatisfactory and 
harsh. Justification applies to facts or opinions.60 However, subjecting opinion to the same standard 
of proof as fact would be "a significant inhibition on free speech".61 Potential critics may hold 
themselves only to the "safest" of statements in order to avoid harsh penalties. This risks hindering 
valuable discussion and criticism through concerns that statements may not "survive the court test of 
'truth' even when [there were] reasonable grounds to believe them to be accurate".62 The defence of 
honest opinion then softens the burden of proving truth and encourages discussion and debate.63  
E Opinions are Less Damaging than Fact 
Aside from the right of free speech, another basis behind honest opinion is the notion that 
"words which are clearly comment are likely to be treated with more caution by the reasonable 
  
55  Also, "justification". See Milmo and Rodgers, above n 7, at [12.3]. 
56  Defamation Act 1992, s 8. 
57  John Burrows and Ursula Cheer "Defamation" in Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (6th 
ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2013) 809 at [16.9]. 
58   New York Times v Sullivan, above n 41, at 279. 
59  At 279. 
60  Milmo and Rodgers, above n 7, at [12.3]. 
61  At [12.3]. 
62  Herbert Titus "Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment" 
(1962) 15 Vand L Rev 1203 at 1209. 
63  At 1209. 
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reader and hence are less damaging than assertions of fact".64 A reader will be more wary of an 
opinion statement since it leaves room for other possible conclusions. For example, "I saw Sam in 
the office looking around suspiciously. I think he took the money." There is latitude here for the 
reasonable reader to consider alternatives other than Sam being a thief. Thus, to support the basis of 
the honest opinion defence, John Burrows suggests a reader should be able to discern when an 
opinion is being made and "compare it with his or her own".65    
With the purpose of protecting free speech and a belief that opinions are less damaging than 
fact, the common law courts search for a dividing line between fact and opinion to clarify the 
defence of honest opinion.  
IV INADEQUACY OF THE FACT-OPINION DISTINCTION 
As the concerns underlying the truth defence indicated, uncertainty in defamation law breeds 
self-censorship. Accordingly, to support the rationale behind the honest opinion defence, the law 
must provide clarity and predictability. While the three limbs of the defence, namely honesty, clear 
indication of opinion and a supplied substratum of facts, are in themselves fairly straightforward, 
their implementation has proven challenging. Most elusive has been distinguishing facts from 
opinion in order to determine if the second and third limb has been satisfied.  
A Inconsistency in the Courts 
Courts across the common law countries battle with this dichotomy, often resulting in split 
decisions or similar cases being decided very differently. In the United Kingdom case of Berkoff v 
Burchill (Berkoff), the defendant was a film critic writing for The Sunday Times. In one review, she 
wrote that "film directors from Hitchcock to Berkoff are notoriously hideous-looking people".66 In 
another she wrote that the Frankenstein character in the film of the same name was "a lot like 
Stephen Berkoff, only marginally better-looking".67 The Court of Appeal held this gave the 
impression that Mr Berkoff, a well-known actor, director and writer, was physically repulsive and 
that, since he was in the public eye and made his living partially as an actor, this meaning was 
"capable of lowering his standing in the estimation of the public and of making him an object of 
ridicule".68 In his dissenting judgment, however, Millet LJ reasoned that holding this statement as 
  
64  Mitchell v Sprott, above n 10, at [17] citing Patrick Milmo and WVH Rodgers (eds) Gatley on Libel and 
Slander (9th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1998) at [12.7].  
65  Burrows and Cheer, above n 8, at [3.2.1(a)]. 
66  Berkoff v Burchill, above n 1, at 141. 
67  At 141. 
68  At 151. 
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an actionable wrong would be "an unwarranted restriction on free speech", asserting that "[p]eople 
must be allowed to poke fun at one another without fear of litigation."69  
In 1984, Australian food critic Leo Schofield wrote a negative review of the Blue Angel 
Restaurant, published in the Good Living section of The Sydney Morning Herald.70 Schofield 
lamented that the lobster he had ordered was so appallingly overcooked that it was a "culinary 
crime" and "so crudely handled as to be, for this diner at least, almost inedible".71 Schofield added 
that the menu noted a 45-minute wait time for the lobster. He went on to describe his lobster as, 
"cooked until every drop of juice and joy had been successfully eliminated" and that "the carbonised 
claws contained only a kind of white powder".72 The plaintiffs complained of a number of 
imputations and to three of these Schofield pleaded fair comment. Mr Justice Enderby allowed the 
defence to go to trial for only one: that the plaintiff "was a restaurateur that charged a price for 
excellent fresh lobster which when later cooked incompetently … did not then represent good 
value".73 While the jury agreed that this imputation could be comment, they felt it was not based 
"on proper material for comment".74 As a result, Schofield’s defence failed and Blue Angel and its 
proprietor were awarded a total of $100,000 in damages.75 
In London Artists v Littler (London Artists)76 and Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong (Jeyaretnam), 77 
the facts were startlingly similar but contrastingly decided. In the former case, four actors, via 
identical letters, each gave notice they were leaving a production at the end of the month. The 
defendant published a letter noting their resignations and stating there was a plot by the four actors 
to end the running of the play. The statement complained of in London Artists was: "I am hurt that 
you did not see me before being a party to what, on the face of it, appears to be a plan to close the 
run of [the play]."78 The Court held that this was stated as a fact. Similarly, in Jeyaretnam, the 
defendant spoke at a press conference, "I believe the exodus was engineered. I don’t think it was 
spontaneous." This was based on an incident that occurred at the inauguration of a political party. 
  
69  At 153. 
70  Martin, above n 2. 
71  At 12.  
72  At 12. 
73  At 13. 
74  At 14. 
75  At 14. 
76  London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 All ER 193. 
77  Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1989] 1 WLR 1109. 
78  London Artists Ltd v Littler, above n 76, at 195. 
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After his speech, Mr Jeyaretnam suddenly left, followed by a walk out by 200 members of the 
audience. The statements were regarded by the courts as opinion. 
B Underlying Problem 
Why then, when the three limbs of honest opinion seem straightforward enough, are the results 
so erratic? In the cases above, discussion centres on determining whether a statement or statements 
should be neatly placed in the "fact box" or the "opinion box". Ideally, a test that creates a bright-
line between fact and opinion would provide the predictability and certainty that the rationale 
craves. Yet, this clear distinction continues to elude the courts.  
A bright-line distinction assumes that fact and opinion statements are opposites and therefore 
easily divided.79 In reality, no bright-line can be determined because the distinction is one of 
degree.80 As Robinson J noted, "fact is the germ of opinion".81 The procession from opinion to fact 
statements exists on a continuum with progressing degrees of specificity.82  
While every statement, no matter how specific, will be "in some measure the product of 
inference and reflection as well as observation and memory",83 those at the extreme end of the 
spectrum contain the least amount. These statements deal with "one’s direct sensory perceptions" 
and will be viewed as "certain and true".84 This is especially so with a statement that refers to a 
tangible object. This object "can be compared with the words used to see if there actually is a 
correspondence between the object and the words used to describe it".85 To say that in the school 
dining hall is a table with four legs can be resolved with a fair amount of confidence.86 This type of 
statement contains "virtually no inference, synthesis, or opinion".87 For the sake of argument and 
  
79  Titus, above n 62, at 1222. 
80  Beech Aircraft Corp v Rainey 488 US 153 (1988) at 168.  
81  Ollman, above n 43, at 1021.  
82  Titus, above n 62, at 1222. 
83  E Cleary (ed) McCormick on Evidence (3rd ed, West Publishing, St Paul, MN, 1984) at 27. Even facts 
themselves can be viewed as opinion statements that have been more specifically stated: see Beech Aircraft 
Corp v Rainey, above n 80, at 168. Frederick Nietzsche maintained: "There are no facts, only 
interpretations." Frederick Nietzsche "Aus dem Nachlass der Achzigerjahr" in Werke III at 903, cited by 
Charles Larmore The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996) at 81. 
84  Titus, above n 62, at 1222. 
85  Schauer, above n 42, at 277. 
86  This article does not delve into philosophical arguments as to the existence of matter. For this philosophical 
discussion, see Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford University Press, New York, 1959) at 
ch 2. 
87  Schauer, above n 42, at 278. 
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the need to distinguish one end of the spectrum from another, comparing a statement to a physical 
object could be called a "pure fact". Moving along the continuum, verifying a statement against 
established scientific principles, such as the detrimental physical effects of consuming large 
quantities of fast food, would be less precise but still well within the realm of general acceptance.88  
At the other end of the spectrum lie statements of "pure opinion". These statements cannot be 
compared to objects that are observed or experienced through senses. They cannot even be verified 
against accepted criteria, since "the notion of confirming a statement purely of personal belief is 
nonsensical".89 Often these statements will refer to the "existence of God or the nature of 
knowledge",90 or to matters of personal taste, political views or literary criticism. Sitting on the 
continuum just before these pure opinion statements are those Robinson J in Ollman v Evans 
referred to as "derogatory remarks [or] ... expressions of generalised criticism or dislike without any 
specific factual moorings".91 In this area would also fall metaphorical statements, which through 
context are clearly being used figuratively rather than literally.92 Robinson J provides an example 
where the plaintiff was said to "run a paper by paranoids for paranoids".93 Read in context, the 
statement in that case was described as "obviously used … in a loose, figurative sense … [and could 
not] be construed as representations of fact".94  
The fundamental problem with the fact–opinion distinction is that many statements fall 
somewhere on a continuum between strictly fact and strictly opinion. They often contain varying 
elements of fact, inference, reflection or emotion. It is in this mid-range of the spectrum that the 
three types of statements mentioned earlier exist.95 
1 The intermingled statement 
An opinion statement that is not plainly separated from the facts surrounding it may be 
understood by the reader to be just another fact based on adequate grounds known to the writer.96 In 
the Canadian case of Mitchell v Times Printing and Publishing Co Ltd, the Victoria Daily Times 
  
88  At 278. 
89  At 278. 
90  Michelle Sanders "The Fact/Opinion Distinction: An Analysis of the Subjectivity of Language and Law" 
(1987) 70 Marq L Rev 673 at 680. 
91  Ollman, above n 43, at 1021. 
92  At 1022. 
93  At 1022, citing Loeb v Globe Newspaper Co 489 F Supp 481 at 486 (1980). 
94  Loeb v Globe Newspaper Co 489 F Supp 481 at 486 (D Mass 1980). 
95  See Part II – Law of Honest Opinion. 
96  Milmo and Rodgers, above n 7, at [12.13]. 
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published an article imputing that the arrest of Mitchell solved the murder mystery of Molly 
Justice.97 It continued on to say that the police had looked for Mr Mitchell for a lengthy period and 
that he was brought in on a "boy sex" charge which led to the "uncovering [of] Justice murder 
facts".98 The only points made in the article which were actually true were that Mitchell was 
arrested and charged with murder and he had been booked on a boy sex charge.99 The paper raised 
the defence of fair comment, applying it to the statements that could not be proven true.100 Bird J 
noted that while the article was a mixture of opinion and fact, it was not clear to him which 
statements were intended as which. Nor was it likely to be clear to the reasonable reader.101  
2 The inference of fact statement 
While a statement that sets out a value judgement may be apparent as opinion, one that 
"contains an inference of fact"102 may be more uncertain. This type of statement looks like a fact 
statement. However, it may be a fact stated as an "inference drawn by the writer from other facts" 
and would accordingly be treated like an opinion.103 Gatley on Libel and Slander gives the 
example: "Jones took a bribe."104 If the writer had indicated in his article the events that led to this 
conclusion and indicated that this was his own personal conclusion, the defence may be available to 
him.  
3 The bald statement 
A "bald statement", such as "X is dishonourable", is one that does not identify the facts upon 
which it is based. Although it may look like an opinion, it will often be categorised as a fact because 
it gives no indication that it is a conclusion drawn from other facts. Without the facts to base the 
statement on, the reader would likely interpret it as a fact.105 However, some authorities are 
concerned that labelling bald statements as "fact" may be misleading.106 Lord Phillips suggests this 
  
97  Mitchell v Times Printing and Publishing Co Ltd (No 2) [1944] 1 WWR 400. 
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102 Burrows and Cheer, above n 8, at [3.2.2]. 
103  Milmo and Rodgers, above n 7, at [12.6]. 
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198 (2014) 45 VUWLR  
type of statement is "a comment coupled with an allegation of unspecified conduct upon which the 
comment is based".107  
C Supporting the Rationale 
The examples above indicate that the current method does not adequately support the rationale 
behind the honest opinion defence. First, there is a struggle to attain the predictability and certainty 
needed to prevent self-censorship.108 Reviewers may be reluctant to critique restaurants negatively 
for fear of spending the next eight years in court battles. Scientists may keep thoughts to themselves 
on new or contentious theories. Even a case decided in favour of the defendant can cause a chill on 
speech, especially if it has gone through several courts or was not decided unanimously.  
Secondly, the examples indicate that opinions are not necessarily less damaging than fact. 109 
This rationale is in itself problematic. Opinions play a powerful role in society. Some of the most 
significant events in people's lives are based on opinions: marriage, choice of religion, choice of 
career, to name a few.110 Furthermore, suggesting that factual statements are more harmful ignores 
the point that often "facts by themselves are innocuous".111 If, for example, Emma gets one minute, 
20 seconds in her 100 metre freestyle swim, this reflects nothing on its own. Without an opinion 
attached to it, there is no indication whether that is good or bad. Or if Jack buys wires and solder 
from the local hardware shop, this is simply a neutral statement. However, suggest he is there to get 
ingredients for a bomb and he could be in serious trouble.  
Some situations can generate opinions that have a ruinous impact. Consider the communicator: 
"Identical words, in the mouths of different persons, can carry a radically different weight."112 For 
instance, some statements made by socially weak groups can be ineffective in contrast with 
statements made by more powerful ones.113 The effect a statement will have can depend on how 
favourably disposed an audience is towards the communicator.114 Along that same vein, an opinion 
  
107  Joseph v Spiller, above n 19, at [5]. 
108  Eric Barendt, Laurence Lustgarten, Kenneth Norrie and Hugh Stephenson Libel and the Media: The Chilling 
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1282 at 1306. 
113  At 1306. 
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made by someone highly respected or with expertise, such as a doctor or lawyer, can notably 
influence others.  
Another consideration is the person about whom the communication is being made. In the case 
of Gacic v Fairfax, a food critic reviewed an extremely high-end and expensive restaurant.115 Those 
eating there would expect near-perfection. The review described the food as "unpalatable".116 This 
could cause many readers to shun the restaurant. When paying for expensive food, readers are less 
likely to want to risk getting an unpalatable meal.  
V CURRENT TESTS 
The struggle for clarity and predictability has led to much discussion across the common law 
countries regarding tests to distinguish fact from opinion.    
A Perception of the Reader Test 
As noted earlier, New Zealand and the United Kingdom view the statement from the perception 
of the reasonable reader and consider varying factors as to the context in which it was stated. The 
Supreme Court of Canada adopted a similar test: "What is comment and what is fact must be 
determined from the perspective of a 'reasonable viewer or reader'."117  
However, this test has not defined what a "fact" or "opinion" statement is.118 Saying that the 
statement is an opinion if it is read as an opinion is circular.119 The terms "fact" and "opinion" are 
used so vaguely that nearly any conclusion sought could be made to fit.120 On its own, the test 
becomes self-justifying and thus, neither helpful nor predictable. 
A survey of the United States courts yields more variety and discourse surrounding the debate. 
Two tests emerge with frequency: the "verifiability" test and the "totality of circumstances" test. 
B Verifiability Test 
The verifiability test attempts to find the distinction between actionable and protected statements 
by first assessing whether the statement has a "generally accepted core of meaning".121 If it does, 
  
115  Gacic v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 362. 
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then the question is asked whether the statement is capable of proof or disproof by an objective 
standard. One that is capable of that proof will be considered a "factual statement".122 The 
reasoning is that if a statement is not verifiable, it cannot be considered to convey actual facts and 
thus, cannot be actionable in defamation because of constitutional protections of opinions.123  
In some instances the verifiability test is used as an alternative to distinguishing fact from 
opinion.124 The Supreme Court in the United States concluded that protecting free speech can be 
accomplished "without the creation of an artificial dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact".125 In 
Milkovich v Lorian Journal Co (Milkovich), the majority held that statements must be "provable as 
false before there can be liability under state defamation law".126 Mr Milkovich was a high-school 
wrestling coach in Ohio. During a home match a fight broke out, causing Milkovich's team to be put 
on probation by the Ohio High School Athletic Association (OHSAA). Several parents sued the 
OHSAA. The Court of Common Pleas overturned the probation. Mr Diadiun wrote in his News 
Herald article, "Anyone who attended the meet … knows in his heart that Milkovich … lied at the 
[Court of Common Pleas] hearing after … having given his solemn oath to tell the truth."127 Mr 
Milkovich sued, alleging the statement that he had committed perjury was defamatory.  
The majority held that because Mr Milkovich’s testimony before the OHSAA and his testimony 
before the Trial Court could be compared, the statement was "sufficiently factual to be susceptible 
of being proved true or false".128 While Brennan and Marshall JJ agreed with the majority's theory, 
they disagreed with its application. In looking at the context of the News Herald article, they found 
the statements could not imply, as a verifiable fact, "that Milkovich had perjured himself".129 
Whether the verifiability test is perceived as a method of distinguishing fact from opinion or 
whether it is a separate test to indicate a statement as an actionable wrong, the test creates the same 
issues of uncertainty as the "perception of the reader" test.  
Many statements do not "divide neatly into categories of 'verifiable' and 'unverifiable'".130 Most 
statements will fall somewhere along a spectrum of differing degrees of verifiability.131 The more 
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verifiable a statement is, the "more confident the determinations of truth".132 For example, a 
statement that one owns a home in New Zealand is verifiable, whereas a statement that "X is 
frightening" is not. One can be more confident of the truth of the former statement than the latter. 
While being critical of an over reliance on this test, some courts have acknowledged its limited 
usefulness, as a "minimum-threshold issue".133 As with pure opinion statements, the test may be 
helpful in recognising where a statement sits at the extreme ends of the continuum.  
The marketplace of ideas metaphor, which underlies arguments for free speech and the defence 
of honest opinion, relies on the ideas brought forward in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty.134 Ironically, 
the reason Mill felt opinions should be protected was not because of their inability to be verified but 
rather because since they could often be proven true, they have a valuable place in society. Even 
partially true opinions could lead to important discussion and clashes of opinion, allowing "the 
remainder of the truth … any chance of being supplied".135 
Another difficulty emerges when the test is used on its own. For example, consider a restaurant 
review that states, "The green peppers … remained frozen on the plate."136 While this could be 
proven true or false, because it is in a restaurant review, the reader is most likely to understand it as 
an opinion.137 As a single inquiry, verifiability may yield one result but when the scope of the test is 
widened to include context, another determination often results. This recognises that the "meaning 
of words vary depending on the immediate context of the words and the social setting of the 
statement".138 Some courts have opted to use this test in combination with other tests. 
C Totality of Circumstances Test 
One court that did so was the Court in Ollman v Evans (Ollman).139 There the Court developed 
the four-factor "totality of circumstances" test to determine if a statement was an actionable fact or a 
protected opinion. The first factor determines whether the statement has a precise commonly 
understood meaning that gives rise to factual implications. The second looks at whether the 
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statement is verifiable. The third and fourth factors look to context, namely the immediate context in 
which the statement occurs and the broader social context surrounding the statement.  
The development of a test with factors that look to the statement itself and the context within 
which it sits provides some structure for courts to follow and retains the flexibility needed to analyse 
different types of statements and situations. However, even within Ollman there was disagreement 
with the test's application. Once again, despite applying the same test, the Court was split as to 
whether that test revealed the statements as fact or opinion. Differing views on what was 
contextually relevant and how much weight should be given to those factors caused some of the 
divide.140 Additionally, Wald J in his dissent felt that the statement in that case yielded a precise 
commonly understood meaning that could be verified.141  
The United States Supreme Court in Milkovich superseded Ollman. By ignoring the context 
factors from Court of Appeal's test, the Supreme Court looked at statements in their literal form.142 
This is less ideal in that it makes the defence harder to obtain and does not recognise the reader's 
ability to interpret a statement as an opinion based on its contextual environment.143 It also is 
undesirable to ignore the environment in which the statement exists as this can lead to an artificial 
determination of fact or opinion. Dissatisfaction with the Milkovich test is most evident in the case 
of Moldea v New York Times Co,144 which initially followed Milkovich. Just three months later, in a 
unique turnabout, the same panel of Court of Appeal judges reversed its decision, stating that 
context was a critical consideration.145  
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D Further Inconsistency in the Courts 
While contextual factors are sometimes considered in the United Kingdom and New Zealand 
courts, they are not done so consistently nor are the same factors considered across all cases. For 
example, in London Artists, the Court felt the use of cautionary language was not strong enough to 
convey the statements as opinion.146 By contrast, in Jeyaretnam, the statement, "I am inclined to 
believe", was instrumental in the Court of Appeal deciding that the statements were opinion. That 
judgment did not reflect on the fact that the statement was made in a press conference, which could 
suggest a vessel for imparting news and facts rather than opinions.147 
To most, a value judgement regarding someone's appearance is likely to fall on the extreme 
opinion end of the spectrum. In Berkoff, the majority ignored any possibility that the statement 
implying Berkoff was hideously ugly was an opinion. However, Millet LJ, in his dissent, considered 
the contextual factor that the author was writing in her role as a film critic, allowing for the 
statement to be understood as a humorous exaggeration.148 
In Singh, the fact that the statements made were of a scientific or medical nature influenced the 
Court of Appeal to overturn the High Court decision and rule in favour of the defendant.149 
Hence, different cases regard different factors when assessing whether a statement is a fact or 
opinion.150 The result is an inconsistent and unpredictable defence that risks courts picking and 
choosing the factors to accord with a desired outcome, arguably infringing upon the rationale behind 
the defence.  
VI BALANCING VALUES 
In some situations, the restrictive nature of defamation law does not allow the defence of honest 
opinion enough scope, thus unjustly punishing speech. In others, the uncertainty and incoherency of 
the law hinders free speech through a chilling effect, even before it reaches the courts. The rationale 
underlying the defence of honest opinion is then left unsupported: the marketplace of ideas becomes 
barren, scientific progress is stilted and opportunities to challenge officials are left ungrasped. The 
lack of guidance by current tests creates a concern under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(NZBORA). The common law is required to reflect the NZBORA151 and an incoherent law, vague 
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and unpredictable as defamation law is, will be unable to provide a demonstrably justifiable limit on 
free speech that is prescribed by law as per s 5 of the NZBORA. 
The "prescribed by law" element requires any limit to be imposed by a law that is "adequately 
accessible" and expressed with "sufficient precision".152 This aims to provide the public with the 
ability to foresee the legal ramifications of their actions and conduct their behaviour accordingly. 153 
Thus any limitation against a freedom or right must be balanced on "a clear and transparent basis" in 
order to be demonstrably justifiable.154 While freedom of expression is often considered our most 
highly valued freedom, it cannot be regarded as a "universal social panacea … trumping other 
rights".155 Limitations must be put in place in order to allow other rights and freedoms to coexist 
along with free speech. However, for a proper balance to be created between competing values, any 
limitation on free speech must be "reasonable and demonstrably justified".156  
In Hosking v Runting, Tipping J noted that the question to ask in determining if a particular limit 
on expression is demonstrably justifiable is "whether individual harm outweighs public 
good".157 This concept of proportionality was discussed in R v Hansen.158 In order for a limit to be 
justified under s 5, it must be proportionate to the importance of the freedom or right.159 Thus, the 
high value placed on free speech requires any limitation on that freedom to be of equal or greater 
importance. Individual harm, then, in the form of damage to reputation, must be significant in order 
to outweigh the public good of free speech. That is, the protection from the harm must be a 
legitimate interest needed by society.160 Often courts have been found to limit speech when the 
harm was arguably not proportionately significant, as in Berkoff for example,161 resulting in an 
overly restrictive outcome. More generally, however, the unpredictability of the law that results in 
self-censorship creates its own limitation on free speech.162 That limit is also arguably not 
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proportionate since no harm has yet occurred, significant or otherwise, nor has the limitation 
occurred due to any thought of balancing proportionality. It has simply been self-protection. This 
limitation then does not comply with the "prescribed by law" element of s 5, since it occurs directly 
as a result of the law lacking clarity and predictability.  Consequently, a law that widens the scope 
of the defence of honest opinion and provides more certainty and predictability would be more 
consistent and better comply with the NZBORA.  
VII SOLUTION 
The description from Clarke v Norton, referred to earlier, allows for a broad scope of statements 
that could fall under the category of opinion: "something which is or can reasonably be inferred to 
be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation, etc".163 In the past, courts 
considering this list have tended to rule in favour of free speech by granting the defence.164 
However, in relying on the definition, courts still find themselves searching for a distinctive line 
between fact and opinion, as in Gough v Local Sunday Newspapers.165 There, Gray J, after using 
Clarke v Norton as a base point, went on to differentiate fact from opinion by concluding that fact 
can be "proved or disproved … whereas comment cannot".166 The drawbacks to using verifiability 
as a bright line have already been discussed. Thus while the Clarke v Norton list provides for a 
wider category of statements that could be considered opinion, it still lacks the necessary guidance 
to determine whether the statement would be perceived by the reasonable reader as falling under 
that category of deduction, inference, criticism, remark or observation. Without that guidance, the 
certainty required to measure any limitation against a freedom in a demonstrably justifiable way is 
left wanting. 
The Ollman test utilises four factors, which aim to provide the courts with more guidance. 
However, one of the difficulties with the Ollman test may be that those factors are still too general. 
Determining what should be considered within each factor and the weight it should carry becomes 
"largely subjective".167 It is likely that no one test could be created that would definitively discern a 
fact from opinion in each of the infinite possible scenarios. However, the Ollman test is a strong 
contender and can be used to supply a framework for a more specific set of factors. These would 
provide more clarity, predictability and consistency for the defence of honest opinion in New 
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Zealand.168 Notably, many of these factors have been considered at one time or another in various 
judgments in the United Kingdom and New Zealand but rarely in their entirety, and often erratically. 
While it must be conceded that situations will still arise where courts will disagree in ascertaining 
whether a statement is a fact or opinion, the proposed eight-factor test would also widen the 
availability of the defence, thus better supporting freedom of expression by limiting it only for clear 
and justified circumstances, in accordance with the NZBORA.  
The proposed test would seek to answer an overarching question similar to that already asked by 
New Zealand courts: "Is the statement presented in such a way that the reasonable reader would 
recognise it as an opinion?" 
While the question by itself is circular, a series of factors would in most circumstances guide the 
courts to an answer by helping them ascertain where on the spectrum of fact–opinion the statement 
lies. The first two factors look to the statement itself. 
A Common Usage 
Is the statement one that has a precise commonly understood meaning?169  
This factor gives the court a starting point on the fact–opinion spectrum. As other factors are 
considered, the statement may be adjusted along the spectrum one way or another. 
Some statements are clearly understood as having one meaning and as such will carry factual 
implications. Saying someone is a thief would generally have one understood meaning: the person 
has stolen another's property. However, a further look at other factors, such as the context that the 
statement is in, may expose a figurative meaning, indicating this particular statement may be 
understood by the reader as an opinion. 
B Extent to which the Statement is Verifiable Scientifically 
While the second Ollman factor is one of verifiability, the concern is that this factor increases 
uncertainty. As stated above, verifiability can be difficult to determine and is often a subjective 
determination. Indeed, two judges applying the same four-factor test in Ollman came to opposite 
results because of differing views on the verifiability of part of the statement.170  
Changing this factor to look at the extent that a statement is provable recognises the spectrum of 
verifiability mentioned earlier. This allows for a determination by degree. The greater the extent to 
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which the statement is verifiable, the more likely, in light of the other factors, that it is a factual 
statement.  
In recognising a statement to be a fact or opinion, "[r]eaders will inevitably be influenced by a 
statement’s context."171 The remaining factors look to the context of the statement. 
C Extent to which, if the Statement is not Verifiable Scientifically, it is 
Comparable against an Implicit or Explicit Societal Standard 
Inherent in opinion statements is that they are some form of evaluative judgement, whether a 
conclusion, justification or even an observation, which is held by the communicator to some 
standard. If that standard is evident or is made evident, then this may further indicate an opinion.172  
A standard may be evident if the communicator provides information as to why they are making 
the statement. This is closely linked to providing a substratum of facts. A test that encourages the 
communicator of an opinion to explain why he or she is coming to that conclusion will do two 
things: first, make it clearer that the statement is an opinion and second, allow readers to decide if 
they agree or disagree with the statement. The latter effect goes to the heart of the defence. If a 
reader understands clearly that she could disagree with the statement, that statement will encourage 
debate and discussion and thus should be protected. 
Additionally, an indication of a unique standard, whether implicit or explicit, may suggest an 
opinion. For example, the statement, "Jones is an alcoholic" on its own may give the impression of a 
fact. However, if the reader is imparted with information indicating that the communicator 
vehemently considered all alcohol to be sinful and immoral, then that unique standard may indicate 
the statement to be an opinion.  
D Language Surrounding the Statement 
Does the language surrounding the statement influence the way the statement is perceived? 
A statement, which viewed in a vacuum would appear as a fact, may give the perception of 
opinion when viewed in the context of the remaining article. For example, in the New Zealand case 
of Awa v Independent News Auckland Ltd, the term "body-snatcher" was used. The Court in looking 
at the rest of the article held that "body-snatching" was not meant to suggest improper purpose or 
dishonesty but merely that the body was removed against the wishes of the widow.173  
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E Cautionary Language 
While not definitive on its own,174 phrases such as "I believe" or "in my opinion" can provide 
an indication to the reader that the statement was intended as an opinion. 
F Location of Article or Discourse 
This factor looks to see if the statement is located in a context where rhetorical hyperbole would 
be expected. For example, in the United States Supreme Court case of Letter Carriers v Austin, the 
plaintiff was called a traitor. The Court there reasoned that as this was in the course of labour 
disputes, this type of "exaggerated rhetoric was commonplace".175 Additionally, if the article were 
published in a "comment" section of the paper, it would be more likely to be perceived as containing 
opinion statements than one placed on the front page. 
G Type of Article or Discourse 
Some types of articles clearly indicate that the opinion of the author is being set out, such as 
restaurant or film reviews. Communication in a press conference, for example, would be more likely 
to be understood as factual than that on a late night talk show.  
H Issues of Public Importance 
Public interest is not a requirement under the defence. However, certain speech should 
encourage courts to be more lenient towards determining a statement to be an opinion. Statements 
such as scientific, medical or political speech play an important role in the marketplace of ideas, for 
example. This is echoed in the aforementioned recent changes to the Defamation Act 2013 (UK) 
and in the United Kingdom decision of Singh.176  
1 Application 
Applying the test to the forms of statements and previous cases that were discussed earlier, 
demonstrates how the test will work. 
In Blue Angel,177 the statement that the lobster was "cooked incompetently" could hold a range 
of meanings from clumsily handled to inexpert. Thus to begin, the statement is on the opinion end of 
the spectrum. The extent that the phrase, which is one describing personal taste, is unverifiable 
supports this placement on the spectrum. The third factor recognises the author as a food critic and 
as such may be presumed by the reader to have a well-developed palate and high standards. The 
  
174  "[A] statement which is plainly one of fact cannot be transformed into one of opinion merely by prefacing it 
with the words 'in our judgment'": Turner v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd [1950] 1 All ER 449 at 474. 
175  Letter Carriers v Austin 418 US 264 (1974) at 2871. 
176  Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 6; British Chiropractic Association v Singh, above n 3, at [26]. 
177  See Martin, above n 2. 
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reader would be more likely to interpret his statement as one which the reader could well have 
disagreed with if they had eaten the same meal. The article surrounding the statement describes Mr 
Schofield's impressions of the rest of his meal. These are evaluative statements, which would further 
lend the statement complained of an impression of opinion. While no cautionary language is used in 
this statement nor is it regarding a scientific, medical or political issue, these factors are not strong 
enough to shift the statement from the opinion end of the spectrum. Finally, the article was located 
in the Good Living section of The Sydney Morning Herald rather than being front page news and 
was clearly a restaurant review. By addressing these factors, courts would likely come to the same 
conclusion: the statement was presented in such a way that the reasonable reader would recognise it 
as opinion. 
The Berkoff decision could have benefited from a set of factors to address. It is difficult to 
imagine a more obvious statement of opinion than an aesthetic evaluation. The term "hideously 
ugly" can carry a different meaning to each person and will fall on the extreme end of being 
unverifiable. Ms Burchill made the statement in her role as a film critic, adding an impression of 
opinion to an already personal viewpoint. Moreover, the words surrounding the statement were 
providing an opinion on films and their directors. The statement itself was clearly in the vein of a 
"humorously exaggerated observation".178 
2  Implementation 
While courts have the ability, within the constraints of the legislation, to develop the common 
law by applying the proposed test, it would add consistency and predictability,179 and thereby better 
comply with the NZBORA, if it were inserted as a separate section into the Defamation Act 1992: 
9A Factors in determining opinion 
(1)  In any proceedings for defamation in respect of matter that includes or consists of an expression 
of opinion, a defence of honest opinion by a defendant shall fail unless the defendant proves that 
the statement is presented in such a way that the reasonable reader would recognise it as opinion, 
having regard to the following factors – 
(a)  Whether the statement has a commonly understood meaning indicating factual or 
evaluative implications; and 
(b)  The extent to which the statement is verifiable scientifically; and 
(c)  The extent to which, if the statement is not verifiable scientifically, it is comparable against 
an implicit or explicit standard; and 
  
178  Berkoff v Burchill, above n 1, at 153. 
179  For example, the decision in Berkoff v Burchill, above n 1, would likely have been far different had the 
Court there been required to address these factors.  
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(d)  The extent to which the language around the statement influences the way the statement is 
perceived; and 
(e)  The extent to which cautionary language is used; and 
(f)  The location of the article or discourse; and 
(g)  The type of article or discourse. 
(2)  In any proceedings for defamation in respect of matter that includes or consists of an expression 
of opinion, the court shall, in the process of considering the factors in section 9A(1), not unduly 
restrict statements referring to issues of public importance.  
VIII FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
The focus of this article is on securing a method that could better distinguish opinion from fact. 
The proposed test, while providing greater clarity, certainty and scope for the defence than current 
methods, may still be exposed to some justifiability issues because the law itself does not focus on 
harm. This arguably allows for situations that restrict speech, which may not be doing any harm at 
all. To address this, another issue could be further explored within the defence. While a detailed 
investigation is beyond the scope of this article, brief observations may be addressed.  
In 1962, Herbert Titus formed his own solution to the fact–opinion dichotomy.180 While that 
solution is not directly adaptable to the modern New Zealand defence of honest opinion, the 
principles and philosophy behind it are informative. To indicate that his statement would not lower 
the plaintiff's reputation without justification, Titus felt that the communicator must show he had 
taken reasonable care in gathering information about the plaintiff and that his statement was 
justifiable in light of those facts gathered.181 The reasonable care aspect embodies a principle of 
moral duty and responsibility to others within society.   
Given the potentially formidable power individuals have through online forums and other 
methods of instant global communication,182 consideration should be given in some way to the 
effect a statement will have on a given individual. A possible strategy could be to add a second limb 
to the proposed test, the purpose of which would be to focus on and encourage responsible 
communicating. This limb would recognise that opinion statements can, in some instances, cause 
more harm than factual ones. It could be assessed through a NZBORA inquiry:183 whether the harm 
  
180  Titus, above n 62. 
181  At 1228. 
182  Twitter, for example, provides the perfect conditions for a heedless "140-characters-or-less" comment to 
contact thousands of readers, who in turn pass it on to thousands of others. A plaintiff's reputation can be 
destroyed in minutes. 
183  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
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that has resulted, or is likely to result, from the statement is a demonstrably justifiable reason to 
limit that statement.  
Some factors the limb could consider that may increase the harm a statement may cause include:  
(a) The probability that the statement has to mislead the reader: "Where that probability is 
high, a greater number of people will think worse of the plaintiff for reasons other than 
those which the defendant has relied upon".184 This would further look at the standards 
against which the statement was made. 
(b) Potentially some of the same factors that are looked at in determining remedies could also 
be used in determining whether the harm done was enough to push the statement over the 
demonstrably justifiable threshold. For example, where the defendant has a great influence 
over the public or where the nature of the defamatory statement is a serious allegation, the 
harm will likely be greater.  
The challenge in implementing this second limb would be to not undermine the honest opinion 
defence by causing more uncertainty or by requiring such care be taken before any statement is 
made that it has a chilling effect on speech.  
IX CONCLUSION 
The unfeasible pursuit of a distinction between fact and opinion casts the law of defamation into 
a "chilling" world of uncertainty. A society unable to understand and predict when they are free to 
speak their mind will create self-censorship, hindering the positive public interest effects of debate 
and discussion, as was seen in Singh.185 The proposed test would more effectively provide 
foreseeable results for communicators while giving the courts a flexible approach that better reflects 
the fluidity of language and allows the defence to play its intended role as the hallmark of free 
speech.  
  
  
184  Titus, above n 62, at 1236. 
185  British Chiropractic Association v Singh, above n 3, at [11]. 
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